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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment entered by the Honorable Ernie 
\V. Jones on March 9, 2015. This order dismissed Appellanf s petition filed under the 
Post Conviction Remedies Act, after a motion to dismiss was filed by Ogden City, the 
Appellee in this case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
l 03 and Rule 65C(q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR V/HEN IT GRANTED OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS CESAR'S CLAIM FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND 
THAT CESAR FILED HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE 
LIMITATIONS PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) 
WITHOUT BEING PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF 'WHETHER THE TOLLING 
PROVISIONS APPLY IN UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e) or§ 78B-9-107(3)? 
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POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT CO1\1MIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED 
OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO DIS:NIISS CESAR'S CLAIM FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR FILED HIS CLAIMS 
AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN 
UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BY REL YING ON DOCUMENTS OUTSIDE THE 
PLEADINGS? 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
On appeal from a motion to dismiss, an appellate court ';revie\v(s) the facts only as 
they are alleged in the complaint. The Court is to accept the factual allegations as true 
and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, ,r 2 191 P.3d 4 (Utah 2008) (quoting Hall v. 
Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ~ 2, 24 P.3d 958). Furthermore, an appellate 
court revie\VS an ';appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-
conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of 
la\v." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ~ 55, 234 P.3d 1115, Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, P 
13, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007) (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, P 7, 94 P.3d 
263 (Utah 2004). When revie\ving a dismissal based on rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
~ Civil Procedure, an appellate court must accept the material allegations in the petition as 
tme, and we will affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has failed to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted, i.e., if he "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim." 
See McNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ~ 6, 328 P.3d 874, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) 
quoting Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
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PRESERVATION 
These issues are preserved for appeal because they \Vere appropriately raised in the 
trial court. "'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to 
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."' 
4381'lfain St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, fi 51, 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) (alterations 
in original) (quoting Brookside Nfobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, -;j 14, 48 
P.3d 968 (Utah 2002). 
STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Remedies 
Act as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-104 (the ;;Petition') filed by the Appellant, Cesar 
Daniel Lopez. Cesar filed his the Petition on September 4, 2014 in the Ogden Second 
District Court. (See the Petition attached herewith as ;~Addendum A''.) The petition raises 
several challenges to Cesar's conviction of retail theft on January 28, 2011 in the Ogden 
City Justice Court. Cesar alleged three primary issues in his Petition. First he alleged that 
his conviction \Vas unconstitutional because he \Vas not afforded his rights as outlined in 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a corollary, because he \Vas not 
informed of certain constitutional rights, his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. Second, Cesar alleged that he was not apprised of the effects this conviction 
would have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process rights under the 
U.S. Constitution, more fully outlined in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Third, 
Petitioner alleged that the aforementioned errors occurred because of ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel. 
6 
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The trial court issued a commencement order on 11/10/2014 ordering Ogden City 
(.Ji) to respond to the Petition. Ogden City moved to dismiss the petition on 12/10/2014 under 
t\vo grounds: First that the petition \Vas procedurally barred for failing to seek a trial de 
novo (i.e., an appeal) and second because the Petition was barred by the statute of 
limitations. (See Ogden City's moving papers attached as Addendum B.) The trial court 
granted Ogden City's motion to dismiss because it found that the Petition was barred by 
the limitations period outlined by Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e). The Court 
specifically relied upon ';docket entries'' produced as attachments to the City's motion to 
dismiss to determine that Cesar ·;should have known of the facts (upon ,vhich his petition 
was based) through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Specifically, the trial court 
found that the ';official docket entries represent instances \Vhere the Petitioner- through 
the exercise of diligent efforts- should have known of the potential impending 
immigration concerns that could accompany his guilty plea." (See Order Dismissing Case 
\@ on page 3, attached herewith as Addendum C). Essentially, the trial court relied upon 
minute entry notes in the unverified docket pages attached Ogden City's motion to 
determine that Cesar knevv", or should have known through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence that there would be negative immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As mentioned supra, on appeal from a motion to dismiss, the appellate court 
··review(s) the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, 
~ 2. This court is to accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Hall v. 
7 
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Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ~ 2, 24 P.3d 958). The trial court did not hold 
any hearings, evidentiary or othenvise, in this case. Therefore, the facts as outlined in the 
petition for post conviction relief are as follows: 
Cesar was convicted of Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor on January 28, 2011 
in the Ogden Justice Court in \Veber County (See Justice Court Case No. 101803862). 
Cesar \Vas charged by way of Information on 11/20/2010. He was arrested and taken to 
jail shortly after the alleged offense purportedly took place. Cesar was brought before the 
justice court judge via video court the next morning. The public defender entered as 
counsel and scheduled a pre-trial conference. On or about 12/02/2010 Cesar had a pre-
trial conference and \Vas transported from the jail to his court appearance. He was again 
transported to the justice court for a pre-trial conference on 12/09/2010. On or about 
01/29/2011 Cesar was transported to the jail fully intending on have a trial on his theft 
charge. Ho\vever, his public defender persuaded him to plead guilty to a retail theft 
charge. Another charge \Vas dismissed. Cesar \Vas not informed about the consequences 
this guilty plea \Vould have on his immigration status. At the time of the entering of his 
plea, Cesar was not informed of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Specifically, Cesar \Vas not informed of his right to counsel, his right to a 
public trial, and his right to \Vithdraw his guilty plea. 
All of the aforementioned facts are take directly from Cesar's Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. The Petition also states 
The Statute of Limitations under U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled because 
Petitioner first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition 
is based within the past on year after reviewing his criminal proceedings 
8 
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with his new counsel. He would have raised the issues sooner, if not for the 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petition at 1 11. 
With these facts in mind, Cesar filed his Verified Petition for Relief Under the 
Post Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA Petition) on September 5, 2014. The trial 
issued a commencment order on 11/10/2014, purusant to Rule 65C(i) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, ordering Ogden City to respond to the Petition. Ogden City filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition and accompanying memoranda on 12/10/2014. Cesar is 
essentially alleging three issues in his Petition. First he is alleging that he was not 
afforded his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because he 
Vi was not informed of certain constitutional rights his guilty plea was not entered 
knowingly and voluntarily. Second, Cesar is alleging that he \Vas not apprised of the 
effects this conviction may have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process 
rights as outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 
(2010). Third, Cesar alleged that the aforementioned errors primarily occurred because of 
inneffective assistance of his trial counsel. Cesar alleges that he \Vould have petitioned 
the court for post-conviction releif sooner, if not for ineffective assistance of his trial 
counsel. As mentinoed supra the PCRA Petition alleges that the statute of limitations 
outlined in U.C.A. §78B-9-107(2)(e) is tolled because Cesar first became aware of the 
evidentiary facts on vvhich the petition is based within the past on year after reviewing his 
criminal proceedings with his new counsel. Cesar ,vould have raised the issues sooner, if 
not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. 
9 
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The trial court granted Ogden City's motion to dismiss.i After reviwing exhibits 
attached Ogden City's motion, the trial court found that the PCRA Petition was barred by 
the limitations period outlined by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (2)( e ). The Court 
specifically relied upon unverified "docket entries'' produced as attachments to the City's 
motion to dismiss to determine that Cesar ;;should have kno\vn of the facts through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence." Specifically, the trial court found that the ';official 
docket entries represent instances where the Petitioner- through the exercise of diligent 
efforts- should have knmvn of the potential impending immigration concerns that could 
accompany his guilty plea.'' (See Order Dismissing Case on page 3, attached here\vith as 
Addendum C). Essentially, the trial court relied upon minute entry notes in the unverified 
docket sheets attached Ogden City's motion to determine that Cesar knew, or should have 
knmvn through the exercise of reasonable diligence that there \Vould be negative 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 
SUNIMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it dismissed Cesar's Petition filed pursuant to the Post 
Conviction Remedies Act C;PCRA"). Ogden City filed a motion, arguing that Cesar's 
PCRA petition as time-barred because Cesar filed the petition more than two years after 
his conviction. Ogden City attached a justice court minute entry sheet and referenced it in 
its motion. The trial court ,vas persuaded by this document and held that Cesar's PCRA 
i Ogden City alternatively argued that Cesar's petition was procedurally barred by U.C.A. § 788-9-106(c), but the 
trial court did not address this issue in its ruling. Therefore, it is not an issue for appeal. Cesar's position was that he 
would have raised the issues addressed in his petition through a trial de novo in District Court or through an appeal, 
but for the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. See U .C.A. § 788-9- 106(3). 
10 
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petition was time-barred because he -~should have knO\vn through reasonable diligence" 
the facts upon \Vhich the petition is based. 
The trial court erred because it did not treat the factual allegations in the PCRA 
petition as true, with all reasonable inferences drawn from them in a light most favorable 
to Cesar. Cesar properly pleaded his PCR.A. petition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure by alleging that he discovered, \Vi thin a year of filing his PCRA 
~ petition, that his conviction caused him to suffer adverse immigration consequences. 
Instead of evaluatin£ O£den Citv' s motion in a li£ht favorable to Cesar, the trial court 
'- ~ ., "-" 
relied on information a part from what \Vas properly pleaded. 
The trial court committed reversible error by granting Ogden City's motion to 
dismiss by relying on documents produced outside of the pleadings. As mentioned, the 
trial court dismissed Cesar's case because it revie\ved information contained in what it 
referred to as an ';official court docket sheet." The trial court did not convert Ogden 
xP City's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By failing to do so, the trial court did not provide 
Cesar meaningful notice of its intent to rely on outside documents and an opportunity to 
provide documents of his own to contradict the ''official court docket sheet." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRJAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED CESAR'S CLAIM FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR FILED 
HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BECAUSE BEING 
PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF WHETHER THE TOLLING PROVISIONS 
APPLY IN UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e) or§ 78B-9-107(3). 
11 
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The trial court erred by dismissing Cesar claims without hearing any evidence. 
'When revie\ving a motion to dismiss. the Court must treat '·the factual allegations in the 
~ , ~ 
complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be dravvn from 
them, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The Court must then decide that, even if all of the 
facts contained in the complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief 
it seeks. Id. ·while it is not stated as such, Ogden City's Motion is essentially a motion 
filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah R. Civ. P.) 
Rule 12(b)(6) states that a respondent can move to dismiss a case for'~ failure to state a 
claim upon \Vhich relief can be granted." ·when reviewing a dismissal based on rule 
12(b )(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ';must accept the material 
allegations in the petition as true, and \Viii affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has 
failed to state a claim for \Vhich relief can be granted, i.e., if he 'can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim.,~~ klcNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ~ 6, 328 P.3d 874, 877 
(Utah Ct. App. 2014) quoting Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,624 (Utah 
1990). 
The trial court held that Cesar~ s claims are time-barred because the petition was not 
filed \Vi thin the statute of limitations period as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(1 ). The 
statute states .;a petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed \Vi thin one year 
after the cause of action has accrued." Id. U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(2) defines when a cause of 
action has ';accrued": For the purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the 
latest of the following dates: 
12 
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(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court vvhich has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
c) the last day for filing a petition for vvrit of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for vvrit of 
certiorari is filed; 
( d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of 
the decision on the petition for certiorari revie\v, if a petition for vvrit of 
certiorari is filed; 
( e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on \vhich the petition is based 
Cesar alleged in his petition that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts upon 
which the petition was based within a year of filing his Petition, vvhen he was haled in 
front of immigration court for removal proceedings. Cesar has alleged that only then did 
he discover that this conviction contained immigration consequences that were not 
disclosed to him by his trial counsel and that only then did he discover the irregularities 
of his conviction. Therefore based on the allegations of the Petition, the facts of vvhich 
\Vere personally verified by the Petitioner, the one-year statute of limitations has not 
expired, because Petitioner became m:vare of the evidentiary facts upon which his petition 
is based within a year of filing his Petition, as subsection ( e) anticipates. 
Because Petitioner filed his petition \Vithin a year after he became mvare of the 
evidentiary facts upon which his petition is based, he is well within the statute of 
limitations as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-l 07(2). As stated above, \vhen revie,ving a 
motion to dismiss, the Court must treat "the factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
13 
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196 (Utah 1991 ). The Court must then decide that, ·"even if all of the facts contained in 
the complaint are trne, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it seeks." Id. 
It is clear from the '"Ruling and Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief' that the trial court did not treat Cesar's 
petition as if it \Vas trne and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. The trial court 
held that Cesar's petition was time-barred because, after reviewing a court minute entry 
sheet, attached to Ogden City's moving papers, held that Cesar ··should have kno\vn, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based" 
before he pleaded guilty to the retail theft charge. (See Page 3 of the Order) The trial 
court surmised this after revie\ving the court minute entry sheet because the minute entry 
sheet indicated that his '·parents had retained an immigration attorney on his behalf.~' Id. 
The trial court based its entire decision on the notation entries of the justice court clerk 
into the court docket. 
The minute entry sheets presented by Ogden City, and relied upon by the trial 
court, is belied by the allegations contained in Cesar's petition. Despite the notations in 
the minute entry sheet relied upon by the trial court, Cesar claims that he was not advised 
of the impact this guilty plea \Vould have on his immigration status. Cesar claims that his 
trial counsel did not advise him properly and that he was haled into immigration court for 
removal proceedings because of the misadvise. The United States Supreme Cou~ held: 
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe "penalty," 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. 
Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although 
removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984), deportation is 
14 
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nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has 
enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century, see Part I, supra, at 360-364, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 290-293. And, 
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal 
nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, 
we find it ''most difficult" to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the 
deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, 222 U.S. 
App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that 
noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense 
find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 
150 L. Ed. 2d 34 7 C·There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien 
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely 
aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions"). Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-366, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481-1482 (U.S. 2010). 
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, ''because the negotiation of a plea bargain 
is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. 
Pp. 369-374, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 296-299. The severity of deportation-'the equivalent of 
banishment or exile,' Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 
L. Ed. 1 7 ( 194 7) --only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen 
client that he faces a risk of deportation.'' 
Whether or not Cesar was properly advised by his trial counsel is an issue of 
~ disputed fact in this case. The trial court relied on information contained in a minute entry 
sheet, presumably prepared by a justice court clerk, without hearing Cesar's side of the 
story. The trial court improperly dismissed Cesar's petition without first hearing 
evidence, or at least allO\ving the parties to participate in discovery to determine what 
Cesar knew, or didn't know ( or should have known) when he entered his guilty plea. 
Cesar alleged that he was not advised about the immigration consequences of his guilty 
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plea by his trial counsel. If this allegation is true, it is per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Padilla's incorporation of the test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 
Cesar's Petition was plead in accordance with Rule 65C of the Utah R. Civ. P., 
\Vhich governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief. Rule 65C requires 
that a petition contain, '~in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of 
the petitioner's claim to relief." Id. R. 65C(d)(3). This is a somewhat higher standard than 
the general pleading standard found in rule 8(a). See Id. Rule S(a)(l) (requiring that 
pleadings contain "a short and plain ... statement of the claim shmving that the party is 
entitled to relief'). See 1vlcNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127 at ,I9. ·while Rule 65C no\v 
mentions the possibility of a motion to dismiss as a responsive pleading (See Rule 
65C(k)), it does not outline the appropriate standard of revie\V for such a motion. 
Therefore, the only \Vay to evaluate Ogden City·'s motion is in the context of Rule 
12(b)(6). This court held in klcNair .;Since rule 12(b)(6) does not conflict \Vith rnle 65C, 
we assume all facts and reasonable inferences contained in the petition, as clarified in the 
response to the State's motion to dismiss, in the light most favorable to McNair.'' 1vlcNair 
v. State, 2014 UT App 127 at~ 17 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
To grant a motion to dismiss, the court must treat '·must accept the material 
allegations in the petition as true, and \Vill affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has 
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, i.e., if he ~ can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim."' klcNair 2014 UT App 127 at ii 6. Cesar has sufficiently laid out 
a factual basis for his PCRA Petition and he should be afforded his opprotunity to 
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prosecute his case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR 
FILED HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS 
PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BY REL YING 
ON DOCillvfENTS OUTSIDE THE MOTION. 
The trial court erred when it dismissed Cesar's PCRA petition by relying on 
documents outside of the motion to dismiss. As argued supra the trial court heavily relied 
~ upon documents attached to Ogden City's motion to dismiss. Ogden City attached, what 
the trial court refers to as an '~official docket sheet." This sheet \Vas presented as an 
attachment to Ogden City's motion without any explanation as to \Vhere it came from, 
\Vho prepared it, or \vho entered the information it contained. The trial court relied upon 
the information contained Ogden City's attachment to its moving papers. Such reliance 
was improper and is reversible error, because the trial court failed to convert Ogden 
City's motion into one for summary judgment. ;;If a court does not exclude material 
outside the pleadings and fails to convert a rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to one for summary 
judgment, it is reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without considering 
the outside documents." Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, P6, 155 P.3d 893, (Utah Ct. 
App. 2007) quoting Oakwood Vil!., L.L.C. v. Albertsons,, 2004 UT 101, Pl2, 104 P.3d 
1226 (Utah 2004 ). Rule 12(b) states: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon \vhich relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
17 
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The trial court did not put Cesar on notice that it intended to treat Ogden City's motion as 
a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the motion \Vas not properly converted to a 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and Cesar was not given a meaningful chance to 
rebut the informtion contained in the docket sheet. 
Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 155 P.3d 893, (Utah Ct. App. 2007) is a case on 
point and is instrnctive here. Tuttle involves a \Vater rights dispute between a landO\•Vner 
(the Plaintiff) and the Utah State Engineer and Utah Department of Natural Resources 
(the Defendants). The case involved a controversy from Defendants' discovery that 
Plaintiffs vvere irrigating land \Vith more water than their certified \Vater rights permitted. 
Defendants created a ground\vater management plan after a federal study revealed a 
significant overdraft of vlater in the Valley. The ground\vater management plan called for 
Defendants to conduct a survey comparing the actual irrigated acreage in the Valley with 
the acreage that should be irrigated based on the \Vater rights of the Valley's farmers, 
including Plaintiffs. Defendants sought to discover and stop any illegal watering in order 
to restore the Valley's ground\vater to expected levels. The management plan included 
procedures for notifying lando\vners of illegal \Vatering by letters warning recipients to 
stop the illegal usage. This plaintiff did not receive a letter and did not think that their 
\Vatering practices \Vere illegal. Plaintiffs later entered into a contract to sell the property 
to a buyer. After purchasing the property, the buyer was informed that he did not have 
rights to access the water to his land. The buyer sued the plaintiff in federal court. The 
buyers sought damages for the decrease in the Property's value as a result of the inability 
to legally irrigate the Property to the extent represented by Plaintiffs. The buyers 
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eventually won a federal judgment against Plaintiffs for approximately$ 1,400,000. 
~ Plaintiff then sued the defendant here (the state engineer). Without filing an answer to the 
complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion to 
dismiss, relying heavily on the federal judgment obtained against the plaintiff in their 
federal lavvsuit with the buyer of their land. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
decision because it relied on documents outside the pleadings when rendering judgment. 
The rnle 12(b) conversion procedure consists of ';giving the parties reasonable 
notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary judgment materials for the court's 
consideration.'~ Id. at~ 8 See also Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P .2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1977). ~;The notice and opportunity to submit requirements are especially important \Vith 
respect to the party against whom judgment is entered." See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 
~ (stating that the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is 
particularly important). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that complaints and 
ans\vers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims 
and ans\vers to cross-claims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the 
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings '~include[s] any written or oral 
evidence ... vvhich ... substantiat[ es] ... and does not merely reiterate what is said in 
the pleadings." Oakwood Vil!., 2004 UT 101 at it 12. 
The trial court here did not give Cesar an adequate opportunity to present 
information outside of the pleadings to respond to the minute entry sheet produced by 
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Ogden City. The minute entry sheet did not simply reiterate what was said in any 
pleading before the trial court. Granting of the motion, based on the information in this 
document, was improper and the matter should be reversed. 
Nevertheless, even if the trial court had converted Ogden City's motion to a 
motion for summary judgment, the document would still be problematic and likely 
inadmissible. The document would not be sufficient as a supportive document for a 
motion for summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Rule 56(f) vvould require 
such a document supplied by Ogden City to: 
be made on personal knovvledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Svvom or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. 
The minute entry sheet vvas not verified by any person nor vvas it certified by a court 
clerk, or any other court employee entrusted vvith verifying court papers. Therefore, even 
if presented- it \Vould not be admissible for a summary judgment motion. 
The trial court relied heavily on the minute entry sheet that it ref erred to as an 
'~official docket sheet'~ in its ruling. Because it relied on information presented outside of 
the pleadings, the trial court's decision to dismiss Cesar's case should be overturned and 
remanded so that Cesar be afforded his day in court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by granting Ogden City's motion to dismiss. The trial court 
did not "accept the material allegations in the petition as true." The trial court was 
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required to accept the allegations at face value, and only dismiss the claim if the 
~ allegations could prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Cesar has sufficiently laid 
out a factual basis for his PCRA Petition to survive a motion to dismiss. This court 
should examine the dismissal in the same framevvork as any motion filed pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), because it does not contradict Rule 65C. \Vhen vie\ved in a light most favorable 
to the petition, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition. 
Furthermore, the trial court commited reversible error by relying on documents 
outside the pleadings when rendering a decision. The trial court failed to convert Ogden 
City's motion to a summary judgment motion as required by Rule 12(b ). The trial court 
relied heavily on the minute entry sheet produced by Ogden City and by failing to 
provide Cesar proper notice and a meaningful oppomtnity to offer evidence to contradict 
the statements in the minute entry sheet, the trial court commited reversible error. 
DATED this 21 st day of July 2015. 
RlCHARDS LAW GROUP, P.C. 
J~ 
Aµomey for Appellant 
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Jason B. Richards #13341 
RICHARDS LA \V GROUP, P.C. 
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 781-2026 
Facsimile: (801) 334-9662 
Email: jason@jbrlawyers.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IJ.~ THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT It~ AND FOR 
'WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ ) VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
RELIEF UNDER THE POST 
Petitioner, ) CO~VICTION RElVIEDIES ACT 
vs. ) 
OGDEN CITY ) Case No. 
Respondent. ) Judge: 
Cesar Daniel Lopez ("Petitione(' or "Cesar'1 by and through counsel undersigned, and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-107(3) and 78B-9-401,.hereby petitions this 
court for an order granting relief under the Post Conviction Remedies Act. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1. This Petition seeks to vacate the conviction entered by the Ogden Justice Court on 
01/21/2011. 
2. Petitioner maintains that his conviction was entered in violation of his rights under the 
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VE~'TIE 
3. The Petitioner was convicted of Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor on January 28, 
2011 in the Ogden Justice Court in Weber County (See Case No. 101803862). 
4. At the time of the conviction, Petitioner was a resident of Weber County, Utah. 
5. The Respondent, Ogden City, initiated and prosecuted the criminal charge at issue against 
the Petitioner, by filing a citation with the Ogden City Justice Court in Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
6. The Petitioner is not presently incarcerated, his judgment was not reviewed on appeal, 
and the legality of his conviction or sentence was not adjudicated previously in either a 
civil or post-conviction proceeding. 
7. Petitioner did not directly appeal his judgment, conviction and sentence previously 
because he alleges that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the 
petition is based on within the last one year of this Petition. Therefore, this was well after 
the time limits for those methods of relief had expired. 
8. Cesar would have petitioned the court for post-conviction releif sooner, if not for 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. 
9. This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78B-9-104(1). 
10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307. 
11. The Statute of Limitations under U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled because Petitioner first 
became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition is based within the past on 
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year after reviewing his criminal proceedings with his new counsel. He would have raised 
the issues sooner, if not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
12. Cesar was charged by way oflnformation on 11/20/2010. He was arrested and taken to 
jail shortly after the alleged offense purportedly took place. 
13. Cesar was brought before the justice court judge via video court the next morning. The 
public defender entered as counsel and scheduled a pre-trial conference. 
14. On or about 12/02/2010 Cesar had a pre-trial conference and was transported from the 
jail to his court appearance. 
15. He was again transported to the justice court for a pre-trial conference on 12/09/2010. 
16. On or about O 1/29/2011 Cesar was transported to the jail fully intending on have a trial 
on his theft charge. Ho\.vever, his public defender pursuaded him to plead guilty to a retail 
theft charge. Another charge was dismissed. 
17. Cesar was not informed about the consequences this guilty plea would have on his 
immigration status. 
18. At the time of the entering of his plea, Jorge was not informed of his rights under Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
19. Specifically, Cesar was not informed of his right to counsel, his right to a public trial, and 
his right to withdraw his guilty plea. 
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
CONSTITUTIOI\AL CLAIMS 
20. Cesar repeats and incorporates by reference allegations 1- I 8 of this Verified Petition. 
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21. The failure of Cesa{' s public defender to apprise him of the possible immigration 
consequences of his guilty was a violation of Cesar's constitutional rights. 
22. The failure of his public defender or the Justice Court to apprise Cesar of his 
constitutional rights to counsel, a trial, and other rights listed under Rule 11 constitutes a 
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
23. Furthermore, the failure of the Justice Court to apprise Cesar of his constitutional rights 
as outlined above constitute a violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Cesar Lopez, petitions this Court to vacate the conviction 
\id) entered by the Ogden Justice Court in the aforementioned case and dismiss the charges against 
him. 
DATED this 4th day of September 2014. 
RICHARDS LAW GROUP, P.C. 
Isl Jason B. Richards 
JASON B. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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VERIFICATION 
CESARY DANIEL LOPEZ, being first duly sworn deposes and states that he is the 
Petitioner in the above entitled action~ that he read the foregoing Verified Petition, that he 
understands its contents; and that the facts set forth in this pleading are true ancl correct to his 
ovvn personal knowledge, or belief where indicated. 
DATED this 5 day of September 2014 
Isl Cesar Daniel Lopez 
CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ 
Petitioner 
SWORi"\T AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this 5 day of September 2014. 
5 
Isl Ashley Allen 
Ashley Allen 
Notary Public-State of Utah 
Commission No. 604117 
Comm. Exp. 12-16-2014 
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Michael S. Junk, #5095 
Wm. Gregory Burdett, #7825 
Ogden City Prosecutor's Office 
310 - 26 th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Tel: (801) 629-8595 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
,VEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






l\i!OTION TO DISJVIISS PETITI01' 
FOR POST-COiVVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 140905670 
Judge Ernie \V. Jones 
Ogden City, by and through the undersigned attorney, submits this Memorandum 
Supporting Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
FACTS 
1. This case ,vas initiated on November 22, 2010, charging Cesar Daniel Lopez 
(hereinafter referred to as the ··Petitioner") with tvvo misdemeanor counts: Unla\vful Possession 
or Consumption of Alcohol by Minor, a class B misdemeanor, and Retail Theft, a class B 
misdemeanor. See Ogden City Justice Court Docket for Case# 101803862 hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. On November 22, 2010, Petitioner ,vas arraigned upon the aforementioned 
charges. The court appointed the public defender for the Petitioner. A Pretrial Conference was 
scheduled for December 2, 2010. See Exhibit A. 
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3. On December 2, 2010, defense counsel moved to continue the pretrial conference 
to another day. The case was continued to December 9, 2010, for an additional pretrial 
conference. See Exhibit A. 
4. On December 9, 2010, a bench trial vvas scheduled for January 28, 2011. See 
Exhibit A. 
5. On January 28, 2011, Petitioner, being represented by counsel, entered into a plea 
negotiation in which he pled guilty to the class B misdemeanor, Retail Theft, and the remaining 
charge was dismissed. See Exhibit A. 
6. The Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 60 days or he could pay $500 fine. The 
vi court ordered that his sentence could run concurrent vvith any other time the defendant is serving 
and that the Petitioner could be released to Immigration. See Exhibit A. 
7. Petitioner failed to file a Notice of Appeal with the Ogden City Justice Court. No 
entry of such a filing is listed on the court docket. See Exhibit A. 
8. Petitioner through his counsel filed a petition for Post-Conviction Relief on or 
about September 5, 2014. 
ARGU1\1ENT 
I. PETITI01'1ER'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO SEEK A 
TRIAL DE NOVO. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act contains two provisions that significantly limit a 
petitioner's right to seek post-conviction relief. First section 78B-9-106 precludes a petitioner 
from ·receiving relief if the ground for relief could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
Lopez v. Ogden City 
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss 
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appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 (2008). Seco~d to be eligible for post-conviction relief, the 
petitioner must have "exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Id § 78B-9-
l 02. A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction and sentence and 
is not a substitute for direct appellate review. Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,, 5, 43 P.3d 467. 
To be eligible for post-conviction relief, petitioners have consistently been required to appeal 
errors through regular and prescribed procedures in order to prevent e:x.-traordinary relief from 
being used as a substitute for normal appellate procedures. Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, ~ 36, 
125 P.3d 917. The regular and prescribed method for appealing a justice court conviction is to 
seek a trial de novo in the district court. Id. f 38 and Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-7-118. 
Thus, the critical inquiry to determine whether a justice court defendant must seek a de 
novo trial in order to meet the exhaustion requirement and be eligible for post-conviction relief is 
this: could a trial de novo provide the justice court defendant vvith a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy for the alleged constitutional :violation? Lucero, 2005 UT 79, at, 38. In other words, 
where an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation would be a nevv trial, a justice court 
defendant must undergo a trial de nova to meet the exhaustion requirement. Id. Furthermore, to 
obtain post-conviction relief if a justice court defendant has not sought a trial de novo, the 
defendant must establish that the constitutional violation was the kind that would demand relief 
beyond a new trial. Id. 
In our case, petitioner failed to seek a trial de novo. He was convicted and sentenced on 
August 31, 2012. He was informed-by the court that he had 30 days to appeal any sentence 
given. He did not file a notice to appeal within the 30 days of sentencing. Therefore, petitioner 
Lopez v. Ogden City 
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss 
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pursuant to Section 78B-9-106 of the Utah Code Annotated is procedurally barred from seeking 
post-conviction relief because he did not exhaust his legal remedies. 
II. PETITI01""ER'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO FILE 
\YITHIN" THE STATUTE OF LTh'.IIATIONS. 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) contains a one· year statute of limitations. 
Under the PCRA., a ''petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed ¥.r:ithin one year 
after thecause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1). For purposes of the 
PCRA, a cause of action accrues on the latest of the follmving dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final 
judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
*** 
( e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the 
petition is based; 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(2). 1 
Petitioner did not file any direct appeal. Therefore, his cause of action accrued on ~'the 
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is 
taken." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(2) (a). Petitioner was sentenced on January 28, 2011. 
After a criminal conviction in a justice court, a notice of appeal "must be filed vvithin 30 days of 
the entry of that order or judgment." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 38(b) (1). Petitioner . 
therefore had until February 28, 2011, in which to file a notice of appeal. Since he did not file 
1 A cause of action may also accrue on the date of entry of the decision of the appellate court, the last day for 
filing a certiorari petition, or entry of denial of certiorari or entry of the decision on certior?Ui review, or the date on 
Lopez v. Ogden City 
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss 
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any appeal, his post-conviction cause of action accrued on that date and he had one year in which 
to file a post-conviction petition. In other words, a timely post-conviction petition had to be filed 
on or before February 28, 2012. Petitioner did not file his post-conviction petition until 
September 5, 2014. His petition is over two years t_oo late. 
The PCRA one year ''limitations period is tolled for any p·eriod during which the 
petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The· petitioner has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection 
(3)." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). Petitioner has not asserted that he is entitled to tolling 
under this provision. 
Because respondent has asserted that petitioner's claims are time-barred, petitioner has 
the burden to disprove that his petition is time-barred. ''The respondent has the burden of · 
pleading any ground of preclusion ... but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the 
burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
105. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner is both time and procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief 
because he failed to exhaust bis legal remedy by not filing a notice of appeal with the court for a 
trial de novo and by not filing his petition for post-conviction relief before the one year statute of 
limitations. Based on the facts, the law, and the arguments set forth above, respondent 
which a new rule as described in subsection 78B-9-104(1)(t) is established. None of these dates apply to Petitioner 
Lopez v. Ogden City 
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respectfully request that this Court to deny and dismiss the petition for post-conviction relied 
\JI filed by Petitioner. 
Dated this / l> day of O~e..,_, ~,--, 2014. 
~-'ffJ£lc--
Ogden City Prosecu'efr 
CERTIFICATE OF NIAILING 
I hereby certify that on the lQ_ day of {)~·~ar 2014, I served a true and 
vj correct copy of the foregoing NIEMORAL"'IDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR POST-CON--VICTION RELIEF, on the following individuals by filing the 
document vvith the court through electronic filing: 
Jason B. Richards 
r.iJJ Attorney for Petitioner 
because he did not appeal and no new rule is applicable. 
I : 
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OGDEN CITY JUSTICE COURT 
\VEBER COU}rrY, STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY vs. CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ 
CASE NUMBER 101803 862 Other Misdemeanor 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 32A-12-209 - UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR CONSUi\{PTION OF 
ALCOHOL BY JVIINOR Class B Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: November 21, 2010 
Plea: November 22, 2010 Not Guilty 
Disposition: January 28, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej) 
Charge 2 - 76-6-602 -RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTfr,m) Class B 
1fisdemeanor 
Offense Date: November 21, 2010 
Plea: January 28, 2011 Guilty 
Disposition: January 28, 2011 {Guilty} 
CC.JR.RENT ASSIG°N"ED n.JDGE 
NOR.J.\1AN L ASHTON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - CESAR DA~lEL LOPEZ 
Represented by: CITY PDA 
Plaintiff - OGDEN CITY 
DEFENDANT INFO&.vIA TION 
Defendant Name: CESAR DA.~1EL LOPEZ 
Offense tracking number: 15111404 
Date of Birth: January 07, 1991 
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE 
Prosecuting Agency: OGDEN CITY 
ACCOUNT S111flvfARY 
TOT AL REVE1'.TLTE Amount Due: 5.50 
Amount Paid: 5.50 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVE:t--.11.JE DETAIL-TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 0.50 
Amount Paid: 0.§0 
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CASE NUMBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL -TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.00 
Amount Paid: 1.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL-TYPE: CERTITICATION 
Amount Due: 4.00 
Amount Paid: 4.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
PROCEEDINGS 
11-22-10 Case filed 
11-22-10 Filed: From an Information 
11-22-10 Judge Ai~REA LOCKWOOD assigned. 
11-22-10 Filed: Information 
11-22-10 Judge NOR.ivLA..!'-4 L ASHTON assigned. 
11-22-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel 
Judge: NOR.lvL.:\..N L ASHTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lidiad 
Prosecutor: WEISKOPF, DAVIDE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorr.ey(s): VALLEJO, !Ai~ R 
Video 
ARR.AI Gl\ r.IENT 
Defendant i,vaives reading of Information. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
Tbis is the ti.me set for video arraignment. PDA enters as counsel. 
Defendant enters pleas of not guilty to the charges as filed. 
Pre-Trial set for 12/02/10. S1146 bail stands. Defendant has ICE 
hold. 
APPOINTi\tIENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints CITY PDA to 
represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
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CASE NillvIBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor 
Name: CITY PDA 
Address: 
City: OGDEN UT 84401 
Phone: 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/02/2010 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: N arm.an L. Ashton 
310 - 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: NORJ.vI.Au'T L ASHTON 
11-22-10 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 02, 2010 at 10:00 A.!\1 
in Norman L. Ashton with Judge ASHTON. 
11-22-10 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty 
11-22-10 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty 
12-02-10 ivfinute Entry- Pretrial Conference continued 
Judge: NO&v1AJ.'T L ASHTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tiannam 
Prosecutor: BURDETT, W GREGORY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): STUDEBAKER, ivITCHAEL P 
CONTINU.Au.'\iCE 
'Whose Motion: 
The Defendant's counsel CITY PDA. 
Reason for continuance: 
Defendant's parents have retained an immigration attorney. 
Case continued to 12/9/10 at 10:30 a.m. 
The motion is granted. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/09/2010 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Norman L. Ashton 
310 - 26th Street 
Ogden, lJT 84401 
Before Judge: NORJ.vLA.N L ASHTON 
12-02-10 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE Continued. 
12-02-10 PRE-TRIAL CO~lf'ERENCE scheduled on December 09, 2010 at 10:30 A11 
in Norman L. Ashton \vith Judge ASHTON. 
12-09-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CO011FERENCE 
Judge: NORM;\..'N' L ASHTON 
PRESENT 
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CASE NUMBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor 
Clerk: pamr 
Prosecutor: BURDETT, W GREGORY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): STIJDEBAKER, NfICHAEL P 
HEARJN'G 
This is the time set for pr_e-trial conference. Defendant is 
present in custody of Weber County Jail \vith PDA as counsel. 
Negotiations have not been reached. Bench trial is set 1/28/11 at 
10:30 a.m. Bail remains set at S1146. Defendant also has bice hold. 
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 01/28/2011 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Norman L. Ashton 
310 - 26th Street 
Ogden, lJT 84401 
Before Judge: NORLvLl\.i'{ L ASHTON 
12-09-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 28, 2011 at 10:30 .1\.1\f in Norman 
L. Ashton with Judge ASHTON. 
01-28-11 Minute Entry-Minutes for BENCH TRIAL 
Judge: NOR.iv1AN L ASHTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: pamr 
Prosecutor: BlJR.DETT, W GREGORY 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
Defendant's Attomey(s): N°"EBEKER, r.;1A.TTHE\V L 
Interpreter: Angelica Shaefer (Spanish) 
Language: Spanish 
HEARING 
This is the time set for bench trial. Defendant is present, in 
custody of Weber County Jail, \vith PDA as counsel. Trial is not 
held as negotiations have been reached. 
Defendant enters plea of guilty to NIB-retail theft. City moves to 
dismiss remaining charges. 
Court accepts and proceeds ,vith sentencing. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of REI AIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a 
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 60 
day(s) The total time suspended f9r this charge is 60 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Court imposes a pay/stay sentence of $500 cash or 60 days jail. 
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CASE NUMBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor 
Sentence may run concurrent ~itb any other time the defendant is ·· 
serving. Defendant may be released to Immigrations. 
SENTENCE FIN"E 




Total Fine: $500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $257.89 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
01-28-11 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed 
01-28-11 Charge 2 Disposition is {Guilty} 
01-28-11 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is NORivfAi"\i L ASHTON 
01-31-11 Filed order: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Judge NORiv!AN L ASHTON 
Signed J anuazy 31, 2011 
03-29-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.50 
03-29-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 
03-29-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 4.00 
03-29-11 CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 0.50 
Note: 10.50 cash tendered. 5.00 change given. 
03-29-11 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
03-29-11 CERTIFICATION Payment Recejved: 4.00 
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FILED 
MARO 9 2015 
SECOND 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT C ,P ISTRl~T COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





RULING AND ORDER 
ON RESPONDENT'S 




Case No. 140905670 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
Petitioner's Petition for Relief Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act. 
The Court, subsequent to initial review, previously forwarded a copy of the 
Petitioner's Verified Petition to Respondent for response. The Court has 
received Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition and supporting 
memorandum as well as Petitioner's memorandum opposing that dismissal 
motion. Having reviewed the now complete briefing on this matter, the 
Court is prepared to make the following ruling. 
On January 28, 2011, Petitioner pied guilty to a single count of Class 
B Misdemeanor Retail Theft in the Ogden City Justice Court. At some point 
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in 2014, Petitioner was haled before an immigration court for removal 
proceedings that were instigated as a result of his previous guilty plea. 
Central to Petitioner argument for post-conviction relief is the argument that 
he was unaware of the adverse consequences that his guilty plea could have 
on his immigration status. Petitioner maintains that his appointed public 
defender offered ineffective assistance in failing to inform the Petitioner of 
these possible consequences. Related to this argument, Petitioner also offers 
that the Ogden City Justice Court neglected to inform him of his right to a 
public trial and his right to withdraw his guilty plea in addition to the 
possibility of adverse immigration consequences as a result of his guilty 
plea. 
While Petitioner's claims are grounded in an appropriate basis 
pursuant to Utah Code §78B-9-104 and are not subject to preclusion under 
Utah Code §78B-9-106, the Court determines here that Petitioner has 
brought his claims long after the expiration of the limitations period 
established in Utah Code §78B-9-107. Specifically, the Court determines 
that the limitations period outlined in Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(e) began to 
run during Petitioner's misdemeanor proceedings before the Ogden City 
Justice Court or, at the latest, immediately following his sentencing and not 
within the last year when Petitioner began contending removal proceedings. 
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Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(e) sets forth that a Petitioner must file his 
petition within one year after "the date on which petitioner knew or should 
have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition is based." The Court notes here that the limitations period 
does not begin to run as soon as Petitioner affirmatively knows of the 
evidentiary facts fanning the basis of his petition, but rather when the 
Petitioner "should have known" of those facts through the exercise of 
"reasonable diligence." Pursuant to the Ogden City Justice Court Docket 
regarding Petitioner's misdemeanor proceedings, Petitioner was granted a 
continuance on December 2, 2010 due to the fact that his Parents retained an 
immigration attorney on his behalf. Resp't Br. Ex. A at 3. Furthermore, the 
Justice Court informed the Petitioner at his sentencing that he might be 
released to immigration. Resp't Br. Ex. A at 5. 
The Court determines that these official docket entries represent 
instances where the Petitioner-through the exercise of diligent efforts-
should have known of the potential of impending immigration concerns that 
could accompany his guilty plea. As he stood to know of these potential 
consequences, it follows that the exercise of reasonable diligence would 
have alerted him at that time of the procedural mechanisms to appeal his 
sentence to the District Court through a trial de novo. As such, the Court 
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determines that the time for an appropriate filing of a Post-Conviction 
Petition has long since passed since the cause of action began to accrue soon 
after the imposition of Petitioner's sentence. The filing of this petition in 
2014, nearly two years after the limitations period expired, is therefore 
untimely and the Court cannot grant the requested relief. 
The Court therefore GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In accordance with the aforementioned 
ruling, Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DISN15SED. This 
represents the final order of the Court. Not further order is required pursuant 
to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this _J_ day of March 2015. 
~esy, 
District Court Judge \ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the_!}__ day of~ 2015, I sent a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ruling and order to Peti~ione: and Respondent as follows: 
Jason B. Richards 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Richards Law Group, P .C., 
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Ogden City Prosecutor's Office 
Attorneys for Respondent Ogden City 
310 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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